Growth in fossil fuel emissions slowed in 2015, so have we finally reached the peak?

Pep Canadell, CSIRO

Despite robust global economic growth over the past two years, worldwide carbon emissions from fossil fuels grew very little in 2014, and might even fall this year.

A report released today by the Global Carbon Project has found that fossil fuel emissions of carbon dioxide grew by only 0.6% in 2014, breaking with the fast emissions growth of 2-3% per year since early 2000s. Even more unexpectedly, emissions are projected to decline slightly in 2015 with continuation of global economic growth above 3% in Gross Domestic Product.

This is the first two-year period in a multi-decade record where the global economy shows clear signs of decoupling from fossil fuel emissions. In the past, every single break or decline in the growth of carbon emissions was directly correlated with a downturn in the global or regional economy.

This time is different.

However, it is quite unlikely that 2015 is the much-sought-after global peak in emissions which will lead us down the decarbonisation path required to stabilise the climate.

In a separate paper published today in Nature Climate Change, we look in more detail at the possibility of reaching global peak emissions.

Future Earth/Global Carbon Project

What caused it?

The principal cause of this unexpected lack of growth in emissions is the slowdown in the production and consumption of coal-based energy in China in 2014, followed by a decline in 2015.

This has taken China’s emissions growth from close to double digits during the past decade to an extraordinary low of 1.2% growth in 2014 and an unexpected decline by about 4% projected for 2015.

Although China is only responsible for 27% of global emissions, it has dominated the growth in global emissions since early 2000s. Therefore, a slowdown in China’s emissions has an immediate global impact.

Further adding to this main cause, emissions from industrialised economies, including Australia, Europe and the United States, have declined by 1.3% per year on average over the past decade, partially supported by extraordinary growth of renewable energy sources.

In the past every time emissions have fallen has been associated with economic recession.
CSIRO/Global Carbon Project

Have we reached global peak emissions?

Most likely not. One key uncertainty in answering this question is the future of coal in China. But China is pushing to achieve peak carbon consumption as early as possible (and emissions by 2030), and to phase out the dirtiest types of coal from the nation’s energy mix, largely in response to a pollution crisis affecting many of its large urban areas. It is well within the possibilities that growth in coal emissions in China will not resume any time soon, and certainly not at the fast pace of the previous decade.

A strong basis for this assessment is the remarkable growth in non-fossil fuel energy sources such as hydro, nuclear and renewables. These accounted for more than half of the growth in new energy in 2014, with a very similar mix during the first three-quarters of this year. Such structural changes, if continued, could bring China’s peak emissions much earlier than anyone is anticipating and certainly well before 2030.

Although it is unlikely that we have reached global peak emissions, it is very likely that 2015 marks a new era of slower growth in fossil fuel emissions. This is perhaps the first sign of a looming peak on a not-too-distant horizon.

Where from here?

Recent modelling analyses of post-2020 pledges by over 180 countries to reduce emissions to 2030 (the so-called Intended Nationally Determined Contributions) show that peak emissions is not to come any time soon. Under the pledges made, global emissions continue to rise to 2030.

This might well be the future. But models used for such analysis were not that different from those that completely missed the very rapid rise of the Chinese economy in the decade of 2000 and perhaps now its rapid decarbonisation.

However, China is not alone in this game. Industrialised countries plus China, accounting for half of global fossil fuel emissions, have pledged to reduce or stabilise emissions absolutely by 2030.

But the other half belongs to less-developed nations whose pledges do not include absolute emission reductions but departures from business-as-usual scenarios (meaning emissions can increase, but not as fast). This emphasises the disproportionate importance of international climate finances required to help that “other” half of the emissions to peak and join the decline of the rest.

2015 has been an extraordinary year, and not just because of China. Emissions from Australia, Europe, Japan and Russia have all come down as part of longer or more recent trends. Installed wind capacity reached 51 gigawatts in 2014, an amount greater than the total global wind capacity just a decade ago. Solar capacity is 50 times bigger than it was ten years ago.

And emissions from land-use change, albeit with large uncertainties and high emissions from Indonesian fires this year, have been on a declining trend for over a decade. These trends are not stopping here.

Yet the current emissions path is not consistent with stabilising the climate at a level below 2℃ global warming.

If we maintain the level of 2015 emissions, the remaining carbon budget before setting the earth on a path that exceeds 2℃ is less than 30 years away, unless we bet on unproven negative emissions technologies to remove carbon from the atmosphere later in the century.

But 2015 is a historic year to galvanise further action. The trends in emissions are favourable, and countries have the opportunity to negotiate significantly higher levels of ambition to decouple economic growth from emissions.

The Conversation

Pep Canadell, CSIRO Scientist, and Executive Director of Global Carbon Project, CSIRO

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.


Historic Paris climate pact reached – experts react

Robyn Eckersley, University of Melbourne; Catherine Gautier, University of California, Santa Barbara; Cathy Alexander, University of Melbourne; Clive Hamilton; David Hodgkinson, University of Western Australia; Frank Jotzo, Australian National University; Jessica Hellmann, University of Minnesota; Katharine Hayhoe, Texas Tech University; Matt McDonald, The University of Queensland; Pep Canadell, CSIRO, and Peter Christoff, University of Melbourne

After two weeks of negotiations in Paris, the world’s nations have reached a global deal to tackle climate change (read the text here). The agreement commits 196 countries to help limit global warming to “well below 2℃ above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5℃”.

Under the agreement:

  • Countries will pursue their self-determined emissions targets from 2020 onwards.

  • The national targets will be reviewed and strengthened every five years.

  • Global emissions should peak “as soon as possible”.

  • By the second half of this century, greenhouse gas emissions should be balanced out by sinks, processes that remove them from the air.

  • Developed nations will contribute at least US$100 billion a year from 2020 to help poorer nations deal with climate change.

Below, our experts react to the agreement:

Robyn Eckersley, Professor of Political Science, University of Melbourne

The signature achievement of the Paris Agreement is a much bolder temperature target than expected: a ceiling of 2℃ warming, plus the pursuit of the safer target of 1.5℃.

Yet the parties have formally acknowledged that the 185 national pledges submitted thus far for the post-2020 period are well short of what is required to prevent dangerous climate change. The success of the Paris Agreement will therefore turn on how quickly the parties are able to ratchet up their ambition over time.

The good news is that the parties have agreed to relatively short, five-yearly cycles of nationally determined contributions. They have also agreed that each successive contribution shall be a progression beyond the previous one and reflect each party’s highest possible ambition.

The bad news is that there is no requirement that the parties must review and upgrade their existing pledges before 2030, although they may voluntarily choose to do so at any time.

On a worst-case scenario, we could see no ratcheting up of pledges over the next 15 years, just as we have seen no shift in the Copenhagen 2020 pledges made in early 2010. This would require much more heroic efforts in subsequent cycles and make it much harder to reduce the risks of dangerous warming.

However, the worst-case scenario is unlikely. There will be a facilitative dialogue in 2019 to take stock of collective effort, and we can expect some parties to upgrade their existing pledge.

In 2020, parties are required to communicate their next round of contributions for the post-2025 and 2030 periods. Parties are also urged to formulate long-term emission reduction strategies. This will exert further pressure on parties to lift their horizons and their game.

Together these various provisions provide a clear signal for everyone, but especially the business community: there is only one direction for emissions to go, and that is down, and the faster the better.

Clive Hamilton, Professor of Public Ethics, Centre For Applied Philosophy & Public Ethics, Charles Stuart University

Twenty-three years after signing the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, the nations of the world have at last decided to act on it. The Paris Agreement will mark a turning point in so many ways and represents a victory that would have seemed impossible even one or two years ago.

We knew coming into the conference that the global emissions pathway embodied in the agreement would fall well short of what the science tells us is needed to avoid dangerous climate change. We remain on track for an Earth that will be three or so degrees warmer – a world that must be avoided at all costs.

Before they came to Paris, countries had made their pledges for the next 10-15 years and they were not up for negotiation. So what was always at stake in Paris was how far the outcome would go to reflect new realities, consolidate progress and, critically, define a mechanism for much deeper emission cuts over the next decade or two.

Assessed in these terms, the Paris Agreement is as good as could be hoped for. Two or three years ago the inclusion of an ambition to “pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5℃” would have been unthinkable.

While the Agreement does not acknowledge the severely constrained carbon budget, the commitment to global peaking of emissions “as soon as possible … and rapid reductions thereafter” reflects a new urgency.

And the redrawing of the developed/developing country map, and the significant shift away from the trench warfare of previous climate summits, marks a new road for future commitments.

The decisive question now is how powerfully the Paris Agreement will signal to those outside national governments, including business, that the world has entered a new era. Because it is what they do over the next few years that will determine how deep the next round of emission cuts can be. All the indications are that Paris will send a very strong signal indeed.

Peter Christoff, Associate Professor, School of Geography, University of Melbourne

2015 is set to be the hottest year ever recorded. Appropriately, the Paris Agreement contains the strongest temperature goal of any international climate deal so far. Its aims – to strengthen global action to hold warming well below 2℃ and encourage efforts to limit warming to 1.5℃ – frame and drive the Agreement’s ambition.

Robust reference to 1.5℃ was strongly contested and opposed by Saudi Arabia, China, India and some other developing countries as an impediment to their development.

By contrast, the United States and the European Union joined a broad “coalition of high ambition” championed by the small island states, and enthusiastically sought tougher phrasing.

Some are sceptical about why they did so. To quote one negotiator: “The inclusion of these targets merely recognizes the desperate need of climate-vulnerable states, buys their support, weakens their resistance on other issues, and helps split the developing state bloc.”

Such cynicism misses the point. The new goal is not empty symbolism. It is still achievable and has beneficial real-world implications. It ramps up urgency, strengthens expectations for rapid mitigation by governments and the private sector, and intensifies pressure for funding transfers to the developing world. (The Agreement also calls for a new IPCC report in 2018 to look at mitigation pathways associated with achieving 1.5℃.)

Inevitably, many provisions in the final text remain insufficient. For example, the deal acknowledges the emissions gap between the currently inadequate national climate pledges and its goal but does not press for the full implementation of even these pledges nor requires their strengthening before 2025. It seeks a balance of emissions and removals of greenhouse gases “in the second half of this century” yet it merely calls for global emissions to peak “as soon as possible”. Its climate finance clauses are dilatory and enhanced contributions to the Green Climate Fund will not be required before 2025.

These limitations must be overcome if we are to meet this historic Agreement’s aim of “significantly reducing the risks and impacts of climate change”.

Pep Canadall, Executive Director of the Global Carbon Project, CSIRO

By many accounts the Paris climate agreement is an extraordinary achievement. It cements the long-term goal of staying under 2°C above the preindustrial Era. However, it falls short from providing specific mitigation milestones to ensure we will be tracking compatible emission pathways in the long journey to the end of the century. The statement of balancing greenhouse gases emission and sinks during the second part of the century is too ambiguous; achieving this goal towards the end of the century would most certainly take the planet above 2°C.

Frank Jotzo, Director, Centre for Climate Economics and Policy, Australian National University

The Paris agreement is a framework for ambitious long term global climate policy. The remarkable achievement of this agreement is that it spells out strong global ambition, a mechanism to move towards meeting that ambition, and universal participation by all countries.

The goal to keep global warming to well below 2℃ and pursue efforts to limit it to 1.5℃ is the right one in light of the science, though it is aspirational given the dwindling global carbon budget. A massive commitment gap exists between this new global goal and the national pledges on the table now. The Paris Agreement provides a useful mechanism for ratcheting up countries’ emissions targets in five-yearly reviews.

Whether the high global goal can be met is unclear, but the world can do much better than the pledges that are on the table now. Decarbonisation is increasingly seen as inevitable. It can be an enabler of sustained economic growth, and is in line with other objectives such better air quality and energy access. And achieving emissions reductions tends to be easier and cheaper than expected, in part because of rapid improvements in low carbon technologies.

Australia played a constructive role in the negotiations. In Paris there was a sense that “Australia is back”. The government’s emphasis on innovation is helpful, as is the commitment to double public funding for clean energy R&D. But the real test will be the review of policies announced for 2017, and the revision of Australia’s national emissions target.

Loss and damage

Matt McDonald, Associate Professor of International Relations, University of Queensland

The issue of loss and damage – the significant costs of unavoidable climate impacts such as sea-level rise, particularly experienced by vulnerable states – emerged as a key point of contention in negotiations in Paris. While vulnerable countries pushed for the inclusion of loss and damage in the agreement, it was opposed by some developed states, most notably the United States, which was concerned that the loss and damage agenda would expose American businesses to law suits for their role in contributing to climate change.

Ultimately, loss and damage has found its way into the final text as Article 8. And the Warsaw International Mechanism, established in 2013 as an instrument to assess and respond to loss and damage, is to continue. Article 8.2 also allows this mechanism to be enhanced and strengthened through subsequent negotiations.

The final text rules out liability or compensation arising from loss and damage, an inclusion that reflects American concerns. But the inclusion of loss and damage is still significant. It is the first time loss and damage has appeared in an international climate agreement, and is ultimately recognition of the inevitability of climate impacts and their disproportionate effects on the world’s poorest.

David Hodgkinson, Associate Professor, University of Western Australia

Loss and damage is also an issue of “climate justice” or legal liability.

At COP19 in 2013 a mechanism for loss and damage associated with climate change impacts was established. That mechanism will now continue beyond 2016. The Paris Agreement, however, represents no real or substantive advance on COP19.

The COP 21 decision establishes a clearinghouse for risk transfer matters and information that will serve as a repository for insurance and risk transfer information, and a taskforce to develop recommendations to address climate change displacement.

Importantly, the COP also agrees that Article 8 of the Paris Agreement “does not involve or provide a basis for any liability or compensation”. Article 8 provides that parties should cooperatively enhance understanding, action and support regarding loss and damage and sets out areas of cooperation and facilitation. And that’s pretty much it.

A report this year found that developing countries will face US$1.7 trillion each year in just economic damage annually by 2050 if global average temperatures rise by 3℃.

In that and other contexts, the decision and the agreement made at COP21 go only a small way to address loss and damage issues.

Climate adaptation

Jessica Hellmann, Director, Institute on the Environment, University of Minnesota

The Paris Agreement largely focuses on the adoption of national pledges towards greenhouse gas mitigation, but it has quite a lot to say about the importance and demand for adaptation.

The Agreement emphasises the need for communication and collaboration among countries toward achieving adaptation, particularly in the developing world where the impacts of climate change will be felt most strongly and who have limited structures in place to adjust to those impacts. It calls for methods to assess adaptation needs by countries leading to recommendations for adoption in future negotiations; it directs all agencies to include climate change resilience in its development aid; and it calls for continued implementation of national adaptation plans.

The Agreement further recognises that climate change will cause loss and damage to countries around the world, but it does not allow for financial compensation for those losses. Adaptation assistance from developed countries, therefore, follows not from formal responsibility but from a desire to assist developing countries. This is a subtle but important distinction with potential implications for the amount and source of money from wealthier to poorer countries. In an effort to grow developed countries’ financial commitments, however, the agreement calls for a minimum investment of US$100 billion a year by 2020 towards both mitigation and adaptation for developing countries.

That adaptation is such a recognised component of the agreement is a step in the right direction, yet the Agreement shows how much remains unknown about the extent of adaptation needed, its best practices, and how to ensure its public and private financing. While exciting to have an agreement in hand that commits to fundamental principles, much remains to be done.

Emissions reductions

Catherine Gautier-Downes, Professor Emerita of Geography, University of California, Santa Barbara

What does this agreement mean in terms of world emissions by mid-century? Clearly, the climate pledges made by more than 180 countries do not align with the mandate to limit Earth’s warming to 1.5℃ by 2100 to limit climate risks. They would lead to 2.7 or 3℃. The agreement offers no alternative trajectory to get the world to 1.5ºC.

It is probably outside the agenda for solutions that emission reductions will be found, through:

  1. the renewable energy “revolution” underway with 2015 investments in renewable higher than in fossil fuels in the world and in the developing countries and, in the future, illustrated by the International Solar Alliance to expand solar development to 100 terawatts;

  2. The pledge by 700 mayors to reduce emissions from consumption and increase the share of renewable by 50% by 2050;

  3. the multiple financial pledges that come to nearly US$80 billion;

  4. the financial and business sectors’ new engagement and demand for a carbon price, including the growing movement for fossil fuel divestment;

  5. the world’s mobilisation of civil society with nongovernmental organisations working together to achieve successes like the abandonment of the Keystone XL oil pipeline and vowing to continue pressuring their states in the years to come.

Drastically cutting emissions in the near term is crucial but not enough without “negative” emissions. Opportunities for negative emissions in the building or forest sectors, for instance, must be central research topics in the coming years. This COP is a historic moment that represents a global power shift and puts the world on the path to the fully carbon neutral and climate-resilient world our children and grandchildren deserve.

Katharine Hayhoe, Associate Professor and Director, Climate Science Center, Texas Tech University

For a climate scientist who’s spent over a decade on the front lines, the Paris Agreement it is like finding out the biggest and most ambitious grant proposal of your career has been funded.

It limits warming not just to 2℃, but possibly 1.5℃; it sets a goal of bringing net emissions into balance within a matter of decades, not centuries; and it establishes the framework to provide tangible assistance to the poorest nations, including both finance and technology. This plan fulfils the vision of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: it will significantly reduce the risk dangerous human interference with the climate system.

As with an ambitious grant, though, euphoria will soon give way to speculation. Will we accomplish all we promised? And if so, how?

The Paris Agreement is not naïve: the majority of its 31 pages lays out the need for ongoing reporting, special IPCC reports, financing for the Green Climate Fund, even naming individual climate Champions, tasked with keeping the process moving. To succeed, it will need all the help it can get; but if it does, all of our work – in climate science, policy, impacts, law, communication, and many other fields – will have not been in vain.

That’s worth fighting for.

Cathy Alexander, Research Fellow, Melbourne Sustainable Society Institute, University of Melbourne

The head of the UN climate summit banged his gavel to approve this new deal at 7.27pm – and it’s a climate denier’s worst nightmare.

Footage of delegates and ministers cheering and hugging will go around the world and be remembered for years. This deal will be seen as a success: every country is on board with an ambitious climate deal.

Politically, that’s game-changing. What happens next is that pressure will mount on every government – particularly developed countries – to do more on climate change. The text talks about capping global warming at 1.5℃; there’s not a single developed country with a target strong enough to do that. So this deal makes it easier for any government to put out stronger climate targets and policies. It’s now much harder for governments to lag behind or stick with what they have. The well-worn claims that “others aren’t acting” and “the world can’t agree” have gone.

Watch the pressure mount on governments to ramp up their targets and policies. Watch the numbers being crunched on what countries’ emissions targets should be to meet 1.5℃. Watch the environmentalists mobilise.

Those who want action on climate change have had their hands strengthened tonight.

The Conversation

Robyn Eckersley, Professor of Political Science, School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Melbourne; Catherine Gautier, Professor Emerita of Geography, University of California, Santa Barbara; Cathy Alexander, Research Fellow, Melbourne Sustainable Society Institute, University of Melbourne; Clive Hamilton, Professor of Public Ethics, Centre For Applied Philosophy & Public Ethics (CAPPE); David Hodgkinson, Associate Professor, University of Western Australia; Frank Jotzo, Director, Centre for Climate Economics and Policy, Australian National University; Jessica Hellmann, Professor of Ecology, Evolution, and Behavior; Director, Institute on the Environment, University of Minnesota; Katharine Hayhoe, Associate Professor and Director, Climate Science Center, Texas Tech University; Matt McDonald, Associate Professor of International Relations, The University of Queensland; Pep Canadell, CSIRO Scientist, and Executive Director of Global Carbon Project, CSIRO, and Peter Christoff, Associate Professor, School of Geography, University of Melbourne

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.

The Paris climate agreement at a glance

Emil Jeyaratnam, The Conversation; James Whitmore, The Conversation; Michael Hopkin, The Conversation, and Wes Mountain, The Conversation

On December 12, 2015 in Paris, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change finally came to a landmark agreement.

Signed by 196 nations, the Paris Agreement is the first comprehensive global treaty to combat climate change, and will follow on from the Kyoto Protocol when it ends in 2020. It will enter into force once it is ratified by at least 55 countries, covering at least 55% of global greenhouse gas emissions.

Here are the key points.

The Conversation

Emil Jeyaratnam, Multimedia Editor, The Conversation; James Whitmore, Editor, Environment & Energy, The Conversation; Michael Hopkin, Environment + Energy Editor, The Conversation, and Wes Mountain, Deputy Multimedia Editor, The Conversation

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.

Removing CO2 from the atmosphere won’t save us: we have to cut emissions now

Pete Smith, University of Aberdeen and Pep Canadell, CSIRO

Over 190 countries are negotiating in Paris a global agreement to stabilise climate change at less than 2℃ above pre-industrial global average temperatures.

For a reasonable chance of keeping warming under 2℃ we can emit a further 865 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide (CO2). The climate commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to 2030 are a first step, but recent analyses show they are not enough.

So what are the options if we cannot limit emissions to remain within our carbon budget?

Emitting more than the allowance would mean we have to remove carbon from the atmosphere. The more carbon we emit over the coming years, the more we will need to remove in future.

In fact, out of 116 scenarios consistent with 2℃ published by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 101 scenarios require the removal of CO2 from the atmosphere during the second half of this century. That’s on top of the large emission reductions required.

So how do we remove carbon from the atmosphere? Several technologies have been proposed to this effect. These are often referred to as “negative emissions technologies” because the carbon is being removed from the atmosphere (in the opposite direction to emissions).

In a study published today in Nature Climate Change, which is part of a broader release by the Global Carbon Project, we investigate how big a role these technologies could play in halting global warming.

We find that these technologies might play a role in climate mitigation. However, the large scales of deployment currently used in most pathways that limit warming to 2℃ will be severely constrained by environmental and socio-economic factors. This increases the pressure to raise the level of ambition in reducing fossil fuel emissions now.

Smith et al. 2015, Nature Climate Change

How to pull carbon out of the atmosphere

The technologies range from relatively simple options, such as planting more trees, which lock up CO2 as they grow, or crushing rocks that naturally absorb CO2 and spreading them on soils and oceans so they remove CO2 more rapidly.

There are also higher-tech options such as using chemicals to absorb CO2 from the air, or burning plants for energy and capturing the CO2 that would otherwise be released, then storing it permanently deep below the ground (called bioenergy with carbon capture and storage).

Bioenergy with carbon capture and storage.
Canadell & Schulze 2014, Nature Communications

We examined the impacts of negative emission technologies on land use, greenhouse gas emissions, water use, earth’s reflectivity (or albedo) and soil nutrient loss, as well as the energy and cost requirements for each technology.

One major limitation that we identified is the vast requirements for land.

About 700 million hectares of land are required to grow biomass for bioenergy with carbon capture and storage at the scale needed in many 2℃ pathways. This would remove more than 3 billion tonnes of carbon from the atmosphere every year and would help to compensate an overshoot in emissions earlier this century.

The area required is close to half of current global arable land plus permanent crop area. If bioenergy with carbon capture and storage were deployed at this scale there would be intense competition with food, water and conservation needs.

This land requirement has made other negative emissions technologies attractive, such as direct air capture. However, current cost estimates for such technologies are between US$1,600 and US$2,000 per tonne of carbon removed from the atmosphere. In contrast, the majority of emissions with a carbon price in 40 national jurisdictions have a cost of less than US$10 per tonne of carbon dioxide.

The study shows that there are many such impacts that vary across technologies. These impacts will need to be addressed and should determine the level at which negative emission technologies can play a role in achieving climate mitigation goals.

Plan A: reduce fossil fuel emissions

We conclude that, given the uncertainties around large-scale deployment of negative emissions technologies, we would be taking a big gamble if actions today were based on the expectation of heavy use of unproven technologies tomorrow.

The use of these technologies will likely be limited due to any combination of the environmental, economic or energy constraints we examined. We conclude that “Plan A” must be to reduce greenhouse gas emissions aggressively now. A failure to initiate such a level of emissions cuts may leave us with no “Plan B” to stabilise the climate within the 2℃ target.

The technologies of today are not the technologies of tomorrow. However, a prudent approach must be based on the level of climate abatement required with available technologies, while strongly investing in the research and development that might lead to breakthroughs that will ease the formidable challenge ahead of us.

The Conversation

Pete Smith, Professor of Soils and Global Change, University of Aberdeen and Pep Canadell, CSIRO Scientist, and Executive Director of Global Carbon Project, CSIRO

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.